Strategic Signaling, External Constraints, and the Invisible Audiences of War
Strategic Uncertainty, Relations with the West, and the Constraints of the U.S. Stance
So far, we have analyzed the letter primarily as a tool for strategic communication aimed at a diverse audience.
However, there is another level of interpretation that deserves attention and that, to be understood, requires shifting our focus from the text to the context.
In other words, we must ask ourselves not only what Zelensky is saying, but why he chose to say it right now.
This is an important question, because no political document of this caliber arises out of thin air. Every text is a product of the historical moment in which it is published. And the historical moment in which this letter appears is characterized by growing strategic uncertainty.
War is no longer the top international priority
One of the most interesting elements of the entire document is probably a sentence that could easily go unnoticed. Specifically, the one in which Zelensky states that the United States is currently heavily focused on the Iranian issue: a sentence that introduces into the text something that goes beyond the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, and introduces the theme of competition between crises.
In fact, this is a fundamental concept based on the observation that while the great powers do possess enormous resources, these are not infinite—nor is their capacity for political attention.
This reality means that every new crisis absorbs time, diplomatic energy, decision-making capacity, and military resources. For this reason, the various areas of international tension inevitably end up competing with one another.
Thus, even though the picture appears more complex, the Middle East continues to generate instability. The competition between the United States and China remains the primary global strategic confrontation. Energy issues remain central, and technological security occupies a growing part of the international agenda.
In this scenario, the conflict in Ukraine remains significant, but it is no longer the only open issue, and it is telling that Zelensky seems to acknowledge this openly.
A sign of political realism?
It is hard to say, though the shift certainly deserves attention because it represents, like it or not, a form of political realism. For a long time, Western public discourse has conveyed the idea of the need for potentially unlimited support for Ukraine.
The reality, however, is inevitably more complex, as over time:
• strategic priorities shift;
• governments change;
• crises change;
• public opinion changes.
And even if all this does not necessarily imply an immediate reduction in support for Kyiv, it is equally true that no international actor can consider a given political configuration to be permanent.
In this sense, the letter seems to demonstrate, for the first time in writing, a full awareness of all this – an awareness that could explain some of its characteristics.
The concern is not abandonment
Public debate often tends to frame the issue in extreme terms. On one hand, total support. On the other, abandonment. In reality, political processes rarely work that way. For Kyiv, the risk likely does not lie in a sudden withdrawal of Western support.
The more concrete risk could be something much more gradual. A shift in priorities. A gradual redistribution of political attention as needed.
A growing concentration of resources on other crises perceived as more urgent: obviously urgent from the strategic perspective of those offering support – support that is never, ever – and this is worth keeping in mind – disinterested. And this is an important distinction, as wars are not necessarily forgotten, but rather simply overshadowed by new emergencies.
And a war that falls off the international agenda inevitably becomes harder to sustain politically, so that from this perspective, the letter can also be interpreted as an attempt to keep the Ukrainian issue front and center: a way to bring something back into the spotlight that otherwise risks becoming a sort of strategic lever.
The American Factor
Within this framework, the most important variable inevitably emerges: the United States of America, given that no other Western actor possesses a comparable ability to influence the course of the conflict.
For this reason, a significant part of the strategic debate revolves around possible shifts in the American stance, much as is happening in the war between Israel and Iran.
And in this sense, the letter seems to take this into account.
Indeed, in some respects, it seems to engage directly with this reality. Not because it contains explicit requests directed at Washington, but because it constructs a specific political representation of the war.
A representation that could become relevant should new diplomatic initiatives emerge, or should existing ones become dormant.
The problem of “quick peace”
This is where a particularly sensitive issue comes into play. There has long been an international debate on the possibility of accelerating a negotiated end to the conflict. The idea of a “quick peace” inevitably holds strong political appeal because long wars generate costs, uncertainty, and fatigue.
For this reason, any proposal promising a quick resolution tends to attract attention.
However, there is a structural limit that is often underestimated: wars can only be ended if the parties involved accept at least a minimal basis for compromise, since no external initiative can eliminate this fundamental condition.
And this is precisely where one of the most interesting points of the letter emerges.
Triangular logic
The dynamic between Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow is not bilateral but triangular. In part, this configuration echoes the logic of “two-level games” described by Robert Putnam, in which each actor is forced to negotiate simultaneously with external counterparts and with their own internal political constraints – a situation that penalizes countries with populist leadership and domestic policies.
This means that every decision made by one of the actors has an impact on the other two.
Let’s imagine a hypothetical scenario.
A U.S. administration decides to strongly push for a rapid end to the war. To achieve a concrete result, however, one essential condition must be met: Russia must also show a willingness to compromise.
If this willingness does not exist, the U.S.’s room for maneuver is inevitably reduced, and this is a point often overlooked in public debate.
Many analyses tend to focus exclusively on Western choices, even though in reality Russian behavior continues to be a decisive variable, and the letter seems designed precisely to emphasize this aspect.
Why Russia’s rejection matters
From this perspective, one of the document’s implicit objectives becomes clearer. Zelensky’s proposal for a meeting does not only have an effect if it is accepted.
It also has an impact if it is rejected, and infact, in some respects, a rejection could have even greater political significance, and the reason is obvious if one considers the strengthening of the narrative that the main obstacle to ending the conflict lies not in a lack of diplomatic initiatives, but in Russia’s choice not to pursue that path.
This narrative can have significant consequences not only for relations between Kyiv and Moscow, but also for how Western allies interpret the conflict. That is why the letter appears to be crafted in such a way as to yield political advantages in both possible scenarios, and infact:
• if the proposal is accepted, it opens up room for negotiation;
• if it is rejected, it strengthens the Ukrainian narrative.
A form of political insurance
Viewed from this angle, the letter almost resembles a form of political insurance: while it does not guarantee a result, it certainly reduces certain risks, and among these, in particular, the risk that, in the future, interpretations might emerge suggesting that Kyiv had obstructed any possibility of dialogue.
The document effectively establishes a public precedent – one that can be invoked in any future discussions, especially in light of what has already occurred in the past at the White House.
From this perspective, the value of the letter depends not only on the Kremlin’s immediate reaction but also on its ability to influence how subsequent developments will be interpreted.
Managing Uncertainty
From the perspective of international relations, a significant part of strategic communication aims not so much at predicting the behavior of others as at reducing the political costs associated with various possible scenarios.
In the end, perhaps, the concept that best describes this part of the letter is a single one: managing uncertainty:
• uncertainty regarding the course of the war;
• uncertainty regarding U.S. policy;
• uncertainty regarding Western priorities; and
• uncertainty regarding the international balance of power.
In such a context, communication serves not only to persuade. It also serves to lay the groundwork, to construct interpretive frameworks, to define the space within which future decisions will be evaluated, and this is likely the letter’s most profound function.
Not so much to convince Putin. Not merely to bolster Western support. But to help define in advance the political framework within which the next moves of all the actors involved will be judged.
For this reason, the document appears less as a simple negotiating proposal and more as a tool for strategic risk management in an international phase characterized by increasing fluidity and a level of uncertainty likely greater than that existing in the early years of the war.
From the European Theater to the Multipolar System: The Invisible Addressees of the Letter
So far, we have examined the letter from three main perspectives:
• the relationship with Putin;
• the communicative dimension; and
• the management of uncertainty regarding the West.
However, there is a further level of interpretation that is likely the most comprehensive and which, to be fully understood, requires stepping outside the European framework -stopping viewing the war solely as a conflict between Ukraine and Russia and beginning to consider it as part of a broader transformation of the international system.
This perspective has become increasingly important in recent years, especially when we consider that the world of 2026 is no longer the same as that of 2022 and, above all, is no longer the same as that of the previous decade.
A conflict that is no longer just a European one
At the start of the war, many observers – in a gross misjudgment – tended to interpret the conflict as a predominantly European issue, without fully understanding its origins, nature, structure, and strategic objectives.
In many cases, it was even reduced to a mere manifestation of Russian expansionism, an interpretation that proved insufficient to grasp its complexity and systemic implications. In this regard, see the points outlined above.
Ultimately, and this must be emphasized in light of the most recent considerations presented, we must take into due account that, although for contingent reasons Europe continues to be the main theater of operations – with the consequence that the most immediate military effects will continue to manifest themselves primarily on the continent- we cannot ignore that, as time goes on, the conflict will continue to produce effects far beyond its geographical borders.
These consequences are already affecting – and will continue to affect to an increasing extent – the energy, trade, and financial sectors, as well as food security, transportation, and strategic technologies. In other words, virtually every major sector of the international economy has been, and is destined to remain, affected to a greater or lesser extent by the fallout from the war.
This means that the number of actors actually involved is much larger than the mere geography of the conflict might suggest, and that Zelensky’s letter seems to clearly reflect precisely this awareness: that of a war which, while being fought primarily on Ukrainian territory, produces systemic effects destined to involve a growing number of state and non-state actors on a global scale.
The multipolar world as an implicit backdrop
One of the most interesting aspects of the document is what it does not explicitly state. The word “multipolarism” does not occupy a central position in the text, though its logic is present in many passages.
I am referring to those in which Zelensky makes explicit reference to international guarantors, those in which he highlights Europe’s role, underscores the importance of the United States, indirectly mentions the Middle East, refers to China, or alludes to North Korea.
In all these cases, the same idea emerges: the conflict no longer unfolds within a system dominated by a single center of power but rather in an environment characterized by a growing plurality of actors, in which the decisions of a single state produce effects that span continents and different geopolitical areas.
In this sense, the letter seems to have been written with full awareness of this complex and multifaceted reality in which nothing is as it appears to most. A reality in which an by no means secondary role is played by intermediary actors of gradually increasing importance – a trend that has only become more evident in recent years, after decades in which most international analysis focused on the great powers.
Today, the picture appears more complex. There are countries that do not fully belong to any of the major blocs and that, precisely for this reason, possess considerable room for maneuver. They are not neutral in the classical sense of the term, but neither are they rigidly aligned.
These are countries that operate according to a logic of strategic autonomy and that, globally, constitute a category of actors that seems to be emerging against the backdrop of the letter.
The Case of India
Of all the possible examples, India is probably the most significant. In fact, in recent years, New Delhi has pursued an extremely pragmatic strategy, strengthening ties with the United States and intensifying cooperation with the West, while simultaneously maintaining working-level relations with Russia and continuing to pursue its own energy interests, carefully avoiding turning the conflict in Ukraine into a definitive choice of sides.
This approach reflects a broader trend in which many emerging countries are quite unwilling to align themselves permanently with a single sphere of influence, as they are largely eager to maximize their freedom of movement by adopting a perspective from which the war in Ukraine is viewed differently than it is in Western capitals or in Moscow.
For these countries, the central issue is not so much determining who belongs to the “right” bloc, but rather who can in some way serve as a harbinger of the future stability of the international system.
And it is to this audience that the letter seems to be addressing itself, leaving no one out- to the point that even the Gulf appears to be an implicit recipient, given that this intermediary role seems highly applicable to the Gulf monarchies.
In recent years, in fact, these countries have assumed an increasingly prominent diplomatic role.
They are not merely energy producers. They have become platforms for mediation. Financial hubs. Autonomous diplomatic actors to the point that it is reasonable to assume it is no coincidence that Zelensky mentioned in his letter to Putin the possibility of meetings hosted in the Arab world.
A reference that must be read very carefully because it does not merely concern the logistics of a potential negotiation, but also represents a concrete political acknowledgment of the growing influence these actors have assumed on the international stage.
In other words, the letter does not merely speak of them but also addresses them as part of that Global South that is transforming into a decisive arena, a concrete political reality, despite still representing an extremely heterogeneous and often controversial category of countries.
Many states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America do not necessarily share the Western interpretation of the conflict, nor do they share the Russian one. They view the war through a different lens, one more closely tied to economic interests, to stability, and to future balances of power.
The growing importance of these actors reflects the gradual shift from a highly hierarchical international structure to a more fragmented and polycentric system in which, for these countries, what matters greatly is how the protagonists of the conflict present themselves on the international stage- specifically, the extent to which the willingness to engage in dialogue, the perception of political responsibility, and the credibility of the proposals put forward matter to them, so that, ultimately, the letter also appears designed to influence these perceptions.
Why the shape of a letter matters
At this point, the significance of the initial communication strategy becomes clearer. Why publish an open letter? Why not limit oneself to traditional diplomatic channels? The answer likely lies precisely in the diversity of the audience.
A confidential document would have spoken to Putin, but an open letter speaks to the world, to allies, to adversaries, to neutral observers, to the undecided, and to those who, today, are still trying to figure out what stance to take regarding the conflict.
In this sense, the very form of the document is so integral to its strategy that it compels us to ask whether this letter was conceived as a negotiating proposal or as the beginning of a battle for perceptions: and the question is by no means trivial, all the more so considering that, perhaps, at this point the most important question is not whether the letter should be understood as a negotiating proposal, since it is decidedly more interesting to ask ourselves what function it was intended to perform within the international competition for perceptions.
This is because contemporary wars are not fought solely on the military front, but also -and perhaps above all – on the interpretive front, to understand and distinguish between those who merely appear to be open to dialogue and those who are genuinely so; between those who merely appear to be responsible and those who are truly so; between those who appear to be rigid and those who are genuinely so; between those who merely appear to be flexible and those who are genuinely so; between those who merely wish to appear interested in peace and those who are genuinely so; and between those who appear interested in continuing the conflict and those who merely claim to be so.
This is because all these perceptions produce real political effects on an entirely new terrain, for which the letter seems to have been designed to initiate a first significant intervention that identified Putin as only the formal recipient, but not the primary one, given that the true interlocutors appear to be Washington, Brussels, the Russian elites, India, the Gulf monarchies, emerging nations, international public opinion, and all those who, directly or indirectly, will contribute to defining the political context within which the conflict will continue to unfold.
From this perspective, the document takes on a different meaning, as it no longer appears merely as a proposal for a meeting but has revealed itself to be a tool through which Kyiv seeks to steer the international debate on the future of the war.
General Conclusion
When viewed as a whole, one final observation emerges: Zelensky’s letter does not appear to be primarily intended to convince Putin.
Too many passages are incompatible with classic negotiation logic. Too many references seem crafted to be read by audiences other than the Kremlin, so that its main function appears rather to construct an interpretive framework.
A framework in which:
• responsibility for the war is personalized in the figure of Putin;
• Ukraine appears open to dialogue;
• any Russian refusal becomes an identifiable political choice;
• Western allies are encouraged to maintain their support;
• non-aligned actors are invited to view Kyiv as a credible interlocutor.
In this sense, the letter resembles less a traditional diplomatic initiative and more a sophisticated exercise in international strategic communication.
A document that uses the language of negotiation to pursue broader objectives. Objectives concerning the distribution of political responsibilities, the shaping of perceptions, and the preparation of the ground on which future developments in the conflict will be interpreted.
And this is likely where its deepest significance lies: not in an attempt to change Moscow’s position, but in an attempt to influence how the rest of the world will judge what Moscow decides to do from here on out.
Moscow, and not just Moscow, but also Washington, Brussels, and all the European capitals.
Essential Technical Bibliography
“Open Letter to the President of the Russian Federation from the President of Ukraine” original text https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidkritij-list-prezidentu-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-vid-preziden-104769
Key Theoretical References
- Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. (Essential for coercive diplomacy and signaling strategies)
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes”. American Political Science Review. (Theoretical basis for audience costs)
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”. International Organization. (A key reference point for triangular negotiation logic).
Strategic communication e narrative warfare
- Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2013). Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order. (Central to the construction of strategic narratives)
- Entman, R. M. (2004). “Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy”. University of Chicago Press.;(Frame analysis applied to international politics)
- Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
- (Basis for non-coercive influence and the perceptual dimension)
Political Communication and Security
- Freedman, L. (2006). The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. Routledge. (The evolution of strategy in contemporary political communication)
- Betz, D. (2008). The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. (Useful for understanding the informational dimension of conflict)
Background readings (optional but relevant)
- Allison, G. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Systemic competition and multipolar order)
- Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. (Structure of the international system)
